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TO : Chief, Intelligence School

DATE: 17 January 1961

FROM :


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SUBJECT: Memorandum of transmission

1. Anyone reading the recent report of the Inspector General on the impact of training within the Agency must be impressed by the care, patience, and man-hours expended in its preparation. The authors successfully studied and have presented the reactions within the Agency to training--the primary purpose of the report. Training and education are such highly professional fields, however, that I think the authors have done less than justice to the acute problems that the Office of Training is trying to solve and the reasons why those problems exist.

2. In the accompanying critique, I have, therefore, attempted to set forth the OTR side of the case. Where I differ with the authors of the report, I say so flatly; it seems to me that issues can be debated only when they are clearly defined. I have intended no disrespect to the authors' attainments, intellectual vigor, or industry.

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Critique of the I.G. Report on
the Impact of Training

The report of the Inspector General on the impact of training within the Agency has four serious flaws: (1) It does not determine objectives, establish criteria by which it can estimate the impact of, or examine the need for, training. Consequently, the report is discursive rather than logical, having a unity only because it is bound to a critique of the schools within OTR. (2) It is parochial. The authors display no acquaintance with the theories or principles of education or training and no curiosity about other training programs in Government, notably those of the State Department, which face problems similar to those of CIA. (3) It is inconclusive. Its recommendations are piecemeal; in no place does the report consider the place and status of OTR in the Agency or the need for an organized body of courses that form a curriculum. (4) It is unrealistic. The report recognizes that Offices of the Agency claim they cannot release officers for training because of the press of business. It does not examine the truth or justice of this claim.

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The Flying Rug Technique

The failure to establish a definite point of view makes reading the report a bewildering exercise. The IG attacks or surveys the impact of training from a number of unrelated positions as if from a flying carpet. This variety of points of view is not helpful in the struggle that has been going on for ten years to establish training on a pragmatic basis. This attitude also produces some curious logic. For example: The report has the following sentences: "The basic responsibility for what is customarily termed 'training doctrine' clearly lies with the operating offices of the Agency and not with the Office of Training."

"No component office in the DD/P claims that it has made more than a beginning on the problem of distilling and recording the doctrine of its operations."

The report commends the Overseas Training Staff of OTR for its work in formulating doctrine and recommends the establishment of a doctrinal training staff in OTR to which the operating offices would forward doctrine. The illogic of this proposal is made the more confused because the report does not define doctrine, examine the methods by which it is produced--in other agencies, for example--, or apparently realize the conflicting views on doctrine that exist within the various operating divisions.

A final example is related to this same disorientation, the blurred vision stemming from the authors' failure to take a firm

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- 3 -

position from which to make their survey. "Training," the report states, "is a function of command, the responsibility for which cannot be transferred to supporting or service elements. The OTR and other training units can provide centralized facilities, expert services and good administration, but only the command echelons can set standards and levels of skill and competence and require their subordinates to meet them."

There is no doubt, of course, of the truth of the statement that training is a function of command. The report, however, proceeds to discuss training from the point of view of the Directorates--which incline toward on-the-job training or none at all. Training is a function of the DCI who could, if he so wishes, establish a training program by *fiat*. Certainly, there can be no effective training as long as each Directorate or even each Office can prescribe its own medicine. The greater the tendency for each Office to set its own standards of training, the greater will be the risk of having the function of training broken down into separate compartments and separate little adjuncts to each Office. Nor can training properly be called a support function, although OTR is a support element. Training is the heart of any profession and without it, standards of knowledge and performance cannot be maintained. Actually, we are relying upon the training older members of the DD/P received in the war years, the antiquated knowledge of which they are passing on to their subordinates. That is, we are becoming more parochial year by year. In the production of intelligence, we are relying upon the

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on the experience
accumulated over
the past 12-15 years

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- 4 -

notion that an economist hired by CIA will simply continue his professional career, as will the scientist, and so become an intelligence officer by status. The authors seem sufficiently imbued with this idea so that they can discourse upon the problem of whether all members of CIA should receive a common basic training in intelligence.

Ignorance of the Principles of Education and Training

The curious illogic just described probably stems from lack of acquaintance with either training or education and the functions of either. It is the function of training to discern the basic principles or rationale underlying empirical action, to establish those principles, line up the process of training with them, and to devise methods of teaching that process. It is the function of education to study the basic motivations and capabilities of man, and to impart a knowledge of them to the student so that he can live up to his fullest capacity. Both training and education require for their instruction specialists of varying sorts, although the task of the instructor of training is in many ways the simpler one.

In the profession of intelligence both education and training are needed, but the distinction between the two should be kept clear. If the analyst or collector is to do a good job, he must understand human motivation and the customs, traditions, and thought patterns of alien people. He will need the continual enlargement of his own sympathies and understanding that only education can give him. If he is to continue to manipulate instruments of analysis and tradecraft, he will

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- 5 -

need continual practice supplied primarily by training courses. At the present time, OTR has one educational course, that on Effectiveness of Americans overseas, and one school dealing largely with educational theory, the School of International Communism. The course and the school, however, are lumped with training courses and their uniqueness is not recognized.

When the authors of the report say that it is the duty of the operating components to supply to OTR the doctrine necessary for training courses, they obviously misunderstand what training is.

The operating components of both the DD/I and the DD/P use empirical means to arrive at their results. By a process of trial and error they have achieved a fairly satisfactory production. They have neither the time nor the training to reduce these empirical methods to doctrine. Even if one component has the energy, the proper people, and the time to set up doctrine, that doctrine is liable to be parochial and singularly specialized because it can tap only a comparatively small area, and each component will believe that it has unique requirements. Or the component will go to the opposite extreme and assume that its methods--not its principles--are applicable anywhere in the world. Witness the present status of clandestine collection wherein it is assumed that a

case officer can operate anywhere in the world with knowledge of a simple set of rules. It is this attitude that has made the case officer scornful of studying languages, areas, or people.

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- 6 -

It is the duty of the operating component to make material available to the instructor and to give him free access to files and people; it is the responsibility of the instructor to hammer this material out into a course and present it effectively. In the due course of time, the course will become doctrine and can be incorporated with other courses in a manual, which will reinforce the doctrine and provide texts for later courses. The IG report implicitly recognizes this teamwork when it commends the work done at 25X1A [REDACTED]. The doctrine of clandestine collection is being hammered out there by instructors who have had experience in the field, who have kept closely in touch with their operating divisions, and who have been trained in proper instructional methods. For a long while, 25X1A the DD/P was inclined to regard the work done at [REDACTED] as academic; the usual comment was, "Oh, that's what they teach in the schools; we do it differently in the field." Gradually, however, as class after class went through, the teachings became doctrine and are now commonly accepted as such.

The IG report does not, however, show that its authors realize that the same problem exists in training for the DD/I. Because the functions of the various Offices differ widely, the operating components have become even more parochial; each Office has its own empirical methods. Each Office understands its own problems, but knows little about the others; moreover, the whole DD/I is singularly ignorant of what the DD/P is doing. If national intelligence is to become a profession, there is an obvious need for a course or courses in general intelligence.

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- 7 -

as well as ⁱⁿ intelligence in its specialized forms. Here again the failure of the report is to see that training is the responsibility of the DCI himself, not the Directorates. The DCI cannot himself, of course, carry out this responsibility without a professional training staff reporting to him and making recommendations. This staff should be permanent; it should be able to act in the name of the DCI himself, and it should have an adequate working group. It would be the responsibility of this staff to survey the whole agency, check in on what other agencies were doing in training, and then to set up objectives for training within CIA. Next, it should determine the courses needed to reach those objectives and direct the Office of Training to prepare the various curricula embodying them. Finally, it should phase these curricula into the career of every professional member of CIA and arrange for the courses to precede promotions--that is, to make them preparatory to the assumption of greater responsibilities. Such a staff, as necessary as the FI staff in the DD/P and much more important, could give to training the stature it deserves. It could, moreover, act as spokesman for OTR--the DTR would act as Staff Director and provide the interlocking directorate. Under this system OTR could properly be spoken of as a supporting element; it could be assured of students for its courses, and it could secure the materials necessary for the creation of doctrine. The result would be to unify the Agency, boost esprit de corps, and enormously increase its effectiveness.

Best of training is, admittedly, a function of command, why delegate it outside such limits? Commanders are inefficiently aware of their training responsibilities, the core is not to deprive them of these responsibilities.

This is the old time curriculum for state

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- 8 -

Piecemeal Recommendations

This kind of analogy means nothing -

The recommendations of the IG report are reminiscent of the advice of an old automechanic on the repairs necessary on a 10-year old car. The repairs will put a 10-year old car on the highways again, but it will still be 10 years old. What is needed is a new model for the fast highways of today. The IG report gives no information on that new model.

No. OTR's future will depend on its role in responding to a gradually increased recognition of the place and value of consistent training (smaller)

The first thing necessary is to give to OTR the prestige needed to carry on its task of training, that is, to permit it with the full assurance of students to lay out a complete curriculum of general courses and related groups of skill courses and then have them phased into the careers of Agency members. Implicitly, the report recognizes this necessity when it says: "Only those officers entering the Clandestine Service through the JOTP are sure to have fulfilled the operational training required and that is accomplished before they come under the administrative control of the DD/P."

When the authors of the report are confronted with the various problems facing the Office of Training, they tinker or evade. Here again the failure to explain their criteria--or the absence of criteria--is evident. They discuss the question of whether or not there should be general intelligence training; they come to no decision. They discuss whether it is the function of CIA to train in such general skills as writing; they prescribe no solution. They report that some members of DD/P doubt the competence of the Management Faculty; they leave the statement dangling. This last is an outrageous piece of gossip placed in the report without further examination. They

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- 9 -

state that brevity of orientation may lead to boredom and superficiality; they accept the foreshortened orientation course without comment. They apparently agree that guest speakers need not be employed, but they warn against too great a use of texts and advocate more face-to-face contact.

These recommendations leave a reader uneasy and bewildered. What can he do with them and how can he act on them? They all slide off the questions they face; they all show that the authors of the report have never really examined the situation; they attempt to treat symptoms instead. There are a number of questions that should be asked about the skill courses, for example. What practical skills does an intelligence officer need in this organization? What standard of performance should be demanded of him? Which of these courses should be made the responsibility of the member himself? Who should take these courses? What has been the impact of the courses taught upon the Agency? (This incidentally, was the chief question that the IG was expected to answer. It is the one question that the authors have continually evaded answering). If the IG had the authority to undertake the investigation, he had the responsibility for putting forward recommendations, however unpalatable, that would improve the situation.

Or again: The Agency hires primarily specialists--or young men that it trains to be specialists. As these specialists rise in grade, they must assume managerial duties for which they are not trained and

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- 10 -

for which they are sometimes pitifully inadequate. People are appointed to staff who have no idea of what a staff is; they are guided by people frequently who do not know how to employ a staff. There are also officers with secretaries capable of taking shorthand who are writing out their memo's in longhand. It is in this area of skill courses that the recommendations of the report were particularly diffuse, mainly suggestions that courses now being taught should be re-examined. The problem here, examination of the impact of training, is to find out whether deficiencies in skills can be remedied by training; what length of time is needed to impart these skills; how efficient training courses now given have been; whether demands for skill courses are not at times simply an excuse for poor administrative or managerial practices. Given the results of such an examination, the IG would be in a position to recommend that OTR set up a curriculum of skill courses, to designate the students who should attend them, and to end a situation where in courses are established by request and then rejected by the very Offices that have requested them.

*There are not
many departments
which are not
really really
deficient in them*

Lack of Realism

There are only two reasons why an Office cannot send some of its members to OTR for training: under staffing or bad managerial practices.

If an Office is really understaffed, it is, in the first place, not doing the job it was established to do. Moreover, it cannot permit either sick leave or annual leave. There is doubt that any such Office

- 11 -

exists. If it does exist, however, its life is necessarily short.

If an Office is poorly administered, that is, if it cannot afford to promote a man because it has no one to replace him; if all the members of the Office are such isolated specialists that no one can leave his desk because he has no replacement; if it is indifferent to the careers of newcomers within it, then that Office should be put under immediate surveillance by the IG. There is some ground for belief that such Offices exist and that its members have become routine officers, narrow-minded and inert.

The IG report treats respectfully the desires, wishes, prejudices of the various Directorates on training and fails to come to grips with fundamental causes. The IG apparently never pressed home an inquiry into the validity of these opinions and emotions.

Sins of Omission

This criticism would be incomplete without some reference to the subjects that the IG report neglected to mention:

anal. by the subcommittee of the commission on training in general, the specific causes of the present situation of training, v. present training

The Training Faculty: The impact of training is largely determined by the character, force, and knowledge of the training faculty. Thus far, the recruitment, training, rotation, and research time of faculty members has been fairly haphazard, almost wholly dependent on the good nature and cooperation of other Offices of the Agency. For example, most of the faculty at [REDACTED] have been lent by the DD/P. The result has been a lack of continuity in both personnel and methods of instruction. The IG report recognizes this impermanence of instructors, but offers only a stop gap solution: a longer tour of

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- 12 -

instruction. This solution will promote continuity, but it will also have serious repercussions in the DD/P. As long as a man is a member of the DD/P, he will seek his promotions and satisfactions there and will be reluctant to spend very much time away from that Directorate. The result will be that DD/P members will be more reluctant to take over instructorships--or that the DD/P will not send its best men over. Rotation at longer periods is only a temporary solution. Probably, the solutions should be for OTR to establish a permanent faculty staff, whose careers will be planned within OTR. These people would rotate to DD/P only to refresh their experience and to keep in touch with latest development.

*But the difficulty
of this is
various*

The faculty for DD/I training is in a different situation and more nearly faces the problem of any good university. Academic people have been recruited from civilian life, or people with academic experience have been tapped in DD/I Offices. These people are either in the OTR career service or on a long period of loan from the DD/I. It seems probable that those on loan may have difficulty in returning to their home offices, or, more certainly, that they will not return to OTR after they have gone back. The problem is not one of continuity but quite the reverse. They have been dropped into fairly narrow slots; they deal with fairly narrow divisions within a subject or school; they have small chance either to demonstrate the range of their abilities or to grow in stature in their particular work. Their situation is worsened by the fact that they have no strong representative on the Plans and Policy Staff of OTR so that plans can be made for their careers while here. It is essential that any teacher, who must constantly

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- 13 -

expend his capital of energy and knowledge, have an opportunity to refresh his mind, to continue his learning, and to plan for the future developments in instruction within his fields.

The solution is obvious. First, for the good of the Office as well as the instructor, there should be a program of cross training so that members may shift from one element of the three schools to another. This cross training will increase cooperation, provide OTR with all the elements of an efficient task force, and will aid in keeping instructors alert. Moreover, it will give to each instructor some chance to demonstrate his competence and hence provide criteria for promotion. Next, OTR should be authorized by proper budget allowances to recognize the need that each instructor has for research, not only in his own field of competence but in those allied to it. Finally, there should be on the P&P Staff representatives for the Intelligence and Communism Schools who would be accessible for recommendations and plans submitted to them, and who would also be directing research toward the building of effective curricula. Moreover, these representatives would be able to represent academic needs more effectively. I can say, with some diffidence, that there now seems to exist among administrators unfamiliar with training, the idea that a teacher giving a lecture or two a day is not really working, that during the period when a course is not being given, the teacher is idling, and should therefore be set to other tasks, and, finally, that an academic background is in one sense suspect: the instructor is incapable of planning for, or establishing a course or courses of instruction. He is regarded with some suspicion as an

- 14 -

intellectual, a theorist, who must be sternly managed by practical men of affairs to see that he remains in the workaday world and keeps his nose to the grindstone.

The JOTP and Training: The DTR was originally appointed to set up a training program for JOT's. He first established for them a 14-week course, the last seven weeks of which were instruction in the Russian language. This course was so successful that a committee empowered to do so recommended that it be given to all newcomers. With this broadening of the course to admit other students, OTR began its development of general and DD/I courses. The BIC, a 6-week course, was excellently conceived and for a time was very successful until the DD/I Offices began withholding their people. At this time, the BIC and the BOC (DD/P orientation) were combined and reduced, first to three weeks and then to two. Portions of the BIC became a 3-week course on the Principles and Techniques of Intelligence, an excellent course that fell by the wayside when again the DD/I Offices withheld students. The BIC, by now the IOC, was reduced to one week. All lectures on Communism had by then been taken over by the SIC. About three years ago, the JOTP had won thorough approval; JOT's were isolated from other newcomers and given approximately a 3-month Orientation Course at HQ. This course has proved so successful that now the IG recommends that all newcomers to the Agency be given the same course. Conditions in the DD/I and DD/P Offices have not changed. We have come full cycle. There is a saying attributed to Santayana that states: "Whoever forgets the past is condemned to repeat it." OTR has not forgotten

SECRET

- 15 -

the abrasions of the past; the authors of the IG report have not heard of them.

Validity of Requests for Training: The IG has remarked that OTR has excellent courses that were given by request a number of times and then shelved for want of students. The report does not survey this rather odd situation, a very important one in the economy of OTR. The request comes in for a new course. OTR assigns a chief instructor to the task of building such a course; he may work as long as nine months in constructing the course, preparing the necessary materials, and pledging the necessary guest speakers. In some cases, he may make elaborate arrangements for tours to outside establishments; he may have to purchase a small library of books for reading material. After two or three runnings, students fail to register. Inquiry to the Office that asked for the course in the first place will disclose, perhaps, that that Office has, or thinks it has, trained enough students in the subject and that the course will no longer be needed.

This type of situation may stem from sheer disregard for OTR; usually, however, it stems from ignorance of what training can do and should do or from poor administration within the requesting Office. In other words, the requesting Office wants to apply a training course like a shin plaster to a serious defect in its own managerial methods. When it finds that the shin plaster won't heal the ulcer, it abandons the course.

OTR should have the authority to examine critically every request submitted to it for a new course, and to reject the request unless it thinks that it is fully justified. Justification, among other things

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- 16 -

would include a list of students who would take the course and an assurance that these students would not be withheld after the course was established.

An illustration will show the need for examination of each request for training. A field training base in the United States requested that its members be given a series of writing courses because the reports they were forwarding to Headquarters were inadequate. The instructor assigned the task of establishing the courses first of all secured copies of the reports submitted in the last six months. The reports were diffuse, formless, and badly disorganized. He found upon consultation with the Office at Headquarters that, while they were extremely dissatisfied with the reports, they had never given to the field base any objectives for them; that they had never supplied a format; and finally, that they were a little vague as to the use to which the reports were put. Consultation with the report writers in the field showed that they had no clear idea of what was wanted at Headquarters and were throwing in every item they could think of in order to forestall objections. A similar examination of certain research reports disclosed that they were bound to an obsolete format which was not supplying the information needed. The courses were given but the chief value of them to the field and to Headquarters lay in long conferences with the report writers and the construction in consultation with them of adequate formats for the reports.

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2		<i>[Signature]</i>	3 May
3		<i>[Signature]</i>	23 May
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5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
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Remarks:

He has some good ideas,
and also some valid
criticisms of our survey.
LBR

Tell with Training Survey
H.

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<i>KIRKPATRICK</i>	2 May

25X1A

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3	[REDACTED]
4	<i>ADTR 11, 7-31</i> <i>W3</i>
5	<i>DTR</i>
6	<i>C/O S</i> <i>7/24/61</i>
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Remarks:	
<p><i>Ed, please be sure this is not an OTR piece. It has some food for thought however. Please return.</i></p> <p><i>Ma H</i></p> <p><i>Thanks - Have taken the liberty of making a few original notes.</i></p>	
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Remarks:

The attached think-piece was contributed by [REDACTED]. The opinions expressed are his -- and his alone; by sending along to you I do not wish to imply concurrence or approval, but I do think the ideas are interesting. If you feel that DTR or ADTR would be interested, please route it to them. It should not, I suspect, go outside OTR.

737B

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FORM NO. 237

Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used.

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ROOM NO. 11	BUILDING T-31	
REMARKS:		
<p>DTR: MB 26 APR 1981</p> <p>Mr Lyman Kirkpatrick</p> <p>for your better understanding</p> <p>of Mr [REDACTED]</p> <p>25X1A</p>		
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C/OS/TR		
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